Virtue vs. Justice: the Inner and Outer Worlds Distinction

Aristotle lines it up pretty clearly. Virtue deals specifically with an individual's moral state; as such, virtue is associated with a single individual's inner world and does not involve other people. Justice, on the other hand, is like virtue on a macro-level; justice involves acting virtuously (according to the doctrine of the mean) in relation to other people. While it seems there can be a reasonable amount of overlap here (I mean, both concepts have to do with the overall cultivation of the good), the distinction between virtue, associated with the inner-world of a single person, and justice, associated with interpersonal relations with others, seems an important distinction for the construction of a just society. Here's why...

If you imagine society like a brick wall, the integrity of that wall relies partially on both 1) the soundness of each individual brick, and 2) the overall stability of the wall, which results from the orientation of each of the bricks to one another. As you've probably guessed, 1) and 2) correspond to virtue and justice, respectively. If you have a wall in which the bricks seems to be laid stably in relation to one another, but each of the bricks is crumbling, old, or weak, then you have an infrastructure for what could be a just society built on non-virtuous citizens. I would be willing to argue that this sort of brick wall (or society) doesn't exist, as it seems that both the wall and the society (built upon spurious foundations) would crumble despite the attempt at structure. So, it would seem (and I think Aristotle would agree) that virtue is a necessary prerequisite to a just society, insofar as society is made up of individuals.

However, if I stay true to my metaphor, just because a just society (or a brick wall) necessarily means that the individual units of which it is made are sound does not mean that having sound individual units (bricks or virtuous people) necessarily leads to a just society. Here is where I believe, to a certain extent, Aristotle and I part ways. In Aristotle, it seems like justice should naturally flow from virtue; one should almost guarantee the other by its very nature. If you consider the brick wall again, though, it is possible to have a brick wall comprised of perfect, completely sound bricks....and to still have a crap brick wall. The relation between the bricks must be such that the wall is given structural integrity by its very design; it's not enough that the individual bricks are perfect (or virtuous, take your pick). As such, the distinction between justice and virtue is useful because, despite their overlap, they are different things and their relationship may not necessarily be reciprocal.