Why can't I be taught moral virtues again?

At this ridiculous hour (oh sleep, my allusive friend), I find myself contemplating how frightfully mistaken Aristotle is in claiming that the intellectual virtues are a prerequisite to the moral virtues. While I already took this issue up in my small-group assignment, it's a problem that strikes a personal philosophical chord within me. Further, I feel that this mistake stems largely from establishing moral virtue as something that must be learned through practice and intellectual virtue as something that can be taught. If Aristotle had considered that both forms of virtue can be taught and/or learned through practice, then the need for intellectual virtue as a prerequisite to moral virtue would be largely eliminated. Here's why...

Intellectual virtue is useful because it acts as an instructional compass by which a person discerns what is right or wrong in a given situation. As such, intellectual virtue must be acquired first in this model because otherwise the person in question has no means by which to aim (with any degree of accuracy) toward moral virtue. However, there are instances in which intellectual virtue can go awry, deviating from this purpose. One easily cited example is the intelligent sociopath, who devotes all of his or her time toward developing intellectually while using said intellect to exploit others. Despite this, intellectual virtue MUST be a prerequisite to moral virtue, right? Because how else are we wayward humans going to hit the mean between excess and deficiency? A lucky dart throw or toss of the dice, perhaps? Unfortunately, this is where I feel Aristotle's model leaves us, if you accept the shortcomings of intellectual virtue. Let's tweak the model a bit.

If moral virtue can be taught, then there is no need for intellectual virtue as a prerequisite. In fact, given this possibility, moral and intellectual virtue could be developed at the same time, and indeed moral virtue could provide the impetus for the development of intellectual virtue. Just as Aristotle suggests that the intellectual virtues direct us toward the mean of moral virtues, so could learning moral virtue direct us toward a more virtuous use of intellectual gifts. If, for instance, we have learned from our parents that courage is a moral virtue, and have similarly learned how to largely avoid its deficiency and excess, then we could easily be directed towards an intellectual exploration of courage. Further, the intellectual virtues would still be desirable, even if they are no longer a prerequisite for the moral virtues, because they lead to happiness and they enable a person to more deeply appreciate moral virtues.